Bioethics is a relatively new discipline in German universities. Be that as it may, the results of bioethical research are of great importance for society. Prof. Eve-Marie Engels is head of the Department of Ethics and the Biological Sciences of the Faculty of Biology at the University of Tübingen, and spokesperson for the Interdepartmental Centre for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities (IZEW) and its DFG post-graduate programme in bioethics. Richard Lamers conducted the following interview with her.
What is the role of bioethics?
I can give you a definition from one of my articles:„bioethics is a main area of interdisciplinary applied ethics. It aims at a normative consensus concerning the range of and limits to human action in dealing with animate nature, including human nature, as this action is presented in daily interactions within the biosphere and in the theoretical and practical contexts of science and research.”
How does bioethics intersect with the frequently used concept of „life sciences“?
The life sciences, under which I include biology and medicine, are one of bioethics’ two central objects. Bioethics encompasses first of all biomedical ethics, which has the human being as the core object of its ethical reflection. But it also encompasses all divisions of ethics that place animate nature as a whole in the center of ethical and moral consideration. I state this here because bioethics is often understood in the restricted sense of biomedical ethics. Here, questions such as: “What is permissible to researchers in the area of research?“or „How should doctors behave towards their patients?” and so on are treated. But for this reason the area of bioethics that deals with animals and plants as well does not come under consideration here. In terms of the concept’s origins, as it was applied for the first time by Fritz Jahr in 1927, bioethics includes human responsibility towards animate nature as a whole. Therefore, bioethics has, first of all, the life sciences as its object, and secondly, bioethics also considers our collective conduct towards animate nature; in everyday contexts of our behaviour towards the environment and animals - environmental destruction, climate change, water and air pollution, intensive mass animal farming and livestock transportation, are all cases in point. All of this is not only determined by biology, but has consequences for our collective behaviour, whether we use automobiles or ride bicycles, go for walks, or whether we adopt a vegetarian life-style.
Bioethics is a broad field and touches on topics such as assisted suicide, genetic engineering, prenatal diagnostics and animal experimentation. What gives this field coherence?
What unites many of these areas, whether it be the creation of Frankenstein monsters, or in-vitro fertilisation, or transplant medicine, is the shifting or transcending of natural boundaries. I use the concept primarily descriptively. For instance, introducing species-unrelated genes into animals is a case of transcending such boundaries. In nature, there normally is no gene transfer from one species to another. But this is now possible through the production of gene-modified plants and animals. Or cloning by the Dolly-method. Dolly belonged to those living beings that normally reproduce ambisexually, i.e. by male and female. Mothers and fathers, egg and sperm cells are required. This combination was simply left out. Or in-vitro fertilisation, which represents a shifting of boundaries at the start of life. Normally, fertilisation takes place in the seclusion of the uterus. But since the ‘Seventies it has been possible to carry out fertilisation in test tubes, in the laboratory. In this way, the beginning of a new life is set there, and an entirely new availability of the embryo is brought into being at the same time.
Does bioethics as a discipline belong to the humanities or to the natural sciences?
Bioethics includes essential aspects of both scientific cultures. The interesting thing about bioethics is that it is an intermediary discipline. Originally, seen in terms of the history of philosophy, philosophy and the natural sciences were one. Aristotle, for example, has his place in both the history of philosophy as well as in the history of biology. He was a great philosopher and biologist. Then philosophy and the natural sciences developed along different lines. And now we are seeing a return to a close relationship between philosophy and individual sciences. If we take a look at research projects in the life sciences today, an ethical aspect is included, for the most part. One cannot simply carry out a research project on some complex medical applications or other, whether brain implants or research on embryonal stem cells, without conducting an ethical discourse. Bioethics is an intermediary discipline in this sense, that by ist very nature must rely on the individual empirical sciences and technology, and reference them concretely and specifically, because bioethics’ central issues arise from the individual sciences and their technologies. But on the other hand it transcends them, because bioethics of course also belongs to ethics as a philosophical discipline.
To what extent does the relationship between casuistics and theory application affect bioethics?
The problems that bioethics deals with are difficult and intricate. Sometimes one doesn’t know at all whether the available principles are applicable to the objects in question. In such cases, there is no casuistics available. Here is an example. In England, egg cells from animals whose cores have been removed are being combined with the genome of human body cells. That means that that we are now producing a mixture of animal egg cells and the genome of a human body cells by means of the Dolly-method. We now must ask, what is the existential status of this novel entity? Is it an animal embryo or a human embryo? In this case, we cannot simply apply the principle of the inviolability of human dignity here; instead we must first clear up the question of what it is that we really have in front of us in this novel entity.
Critics claim that bioethics takes the autonomy of science and technology as a given and often merely delivers the ethical justifications for what is already feasible. Does such a reproach apply to you?
This was often the case in the 60’s and 70’s. At that time, transplant medicine and in-vitro fertilisation introduced a whole new dimension in reproductive medicine. In this connexion, it was in fact so that bioethical reflection made specific reference to this; bioethics was forced to respond reactively. But we now no longer have these retroperspective tasks, but increasingly prospective ones, instead. A great deal of what was once the stuff of science fiction has now shifted to the horizon of feasibility. So it is not the case that bioethics merely reflects after the fact, but rather anticipates certain developments on the theoretical level and reflects on them at the same time, as an early-warning system in advance of their possible realisation. So-called technology assessment studies exist in which an already-existing technology is not evaluated ex post facto, but in which the impact of this technology on nature, on human beings, on our concepts of nature and of humanity and so on are put under prospective consideration. There are surely areas in which we must respond to developments that have already taken place. There are also country-specific differences. It may be that certain technologies are already being researched, while in another country they are not. This can be demonstrated in the case of England and Germany. In England so-called research into human cloning is legal. There is no law prohibiting it. In Germany, on the other hand, it is prohibited. So here, there are discrepancies on the international level.
Is the fact that something is technically feasible sufficient justification to go ahead and implement it?
Clearly we should not implement literally everything that is technically feasible. Technological devlopment brings with it dimensions that are irreversible in terms of their depth and scope. We must evaluate the consequences with especially urgent care where factors are involved that can affect future generations of human beings, animals and plants. Freedom to research is circumscribed by various different principles and guidelines.
Where are the limits to research freedom?
That depends on what objects we are dealing with.With respect to human beings the limits are respect for human dignity and the right to life. But there are also postulates governing animal ethics. Animal ethics has gained ground today, but it is still something to which we do not give enough thought. The relevant principles are dependent on their respective objects. Here in Germany much more is subject to legal regulation. We have very strict laws. Many researchers deplore this and are in favor of more liberal rules. Discussion about this issue comes up again and again. For instance, the stem-cell law was altered in April of this year.
Does a bioethicist like you have personal opinions on bioethical questions such as assisted suicide, for example, or do you deal more with the meta-level?
That depends on what function I am carrying out. If I offer a seminar, for instance, I present various possible lines of argumentation so that the students get to know a repertoire of arguments and therefore a spectrum of positions. But when I am making recommendations or formulating standpoints, I mostly take a clear-cut position. A case in point: I am not in favor of assisted suicide, but rather for improvements in palliative medicine, and I am against cloning, including the cloning of animals, for purposes of producing foodstuffs.
Richard Lamers,
a free-lance journalist and historian, conducted the interview
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